by Nizami Piriev

Between April 16 and May 2, 1945, the Battle of Berlin occurred. Although the outcome of this assault is well-known throughout the world, certain technicalities remain unacknowledged. We must shed light (excuse me for the terrible pun) upon the matter and endorse Georgi Zhukov’s master plan.

The last battle the Soviet army would fight in 1945 went on to become Zhukov’s most notorious realisation. He prepared a swift night time attack using projectors. 140 projectors were installed near the front lines. The task was to direct Soviet infantry by lighting up pathways ahead of them, as well as blinding the enemy once the invasion would be under way. Zhukov ensured that the artillery corps and the infantry would be fully familiar with the nature of the upcoming illuminations, in his classic disciplinary excellence.

15 projectors would cover one advancing infantry corps, to direct their movement effectively and prevent enemy resistance. The lights were placed approximately a kilometer away from the front line, to allow for coverage over about 3 kilometers into enemy territory.

It was impossible to create an even illuminated front due to the uneven terrain. Because of this, corps and division commanders took measures to ensure that infantry kept their heading. Special “azimuth men” were trained, one per infantry company. Special night units were also formed for regiment and battalion commanders. These units were tasked with sending signals, illuminating terrain not covered by projectors, and marking the direction of battalion movement with tracers. These units contained handheld machine guns with large amounts of tracer rounds, as well as flares. The boundaries between advancing regiments were marked with 76 mm tracer shells. 

Bombardment by the artillery would begin at 5:00, while the main assault commenced 25 minutes later. Specially designated projectors signalled “attack” with vertical beams, and the remaining projectors turned on their horizontal beams.  

Improved orientation was indeed achieved. Tanks and infantry in projector-covered regions were superior in movement, as well as more confident, than units advancing in darkness. The enemy remained passive in areas illuminated by projectors, compared to their counterparts in dark areas who illustrated resistance and responded with consistent fire. Enemy infantrymen and artillery resources were exploited by the light beams, which clearly demoralised and demobilised the enemy troops.

Soviet infantry corps adapted amid the battle, successfully reducing dark space by tilting projectors by 65-70 degrees (as partly illustrated by on the image inserted above).

Although the plan was not achieved wholeheartedly and the execution was short of flawless, the rate of advance was extremely fast – the Soviet army was able to advance as fast as 2 km per hour into enemy lines in the middle of the night.

Certain shortfalls did exist, as with any military strategy. In practice, it turned out that a large cloud of dust was created by the artillery fire and remained in the air for a long period of time. Some projectors were unable to penetrate such a persistent aerial challenge, and the penetration of many other projectors was rather shallow. This could have limited the use of projectors at times, although it would be fair to state that they did serve the Soviet army well.

In conclusion, it is fair to assume that Zhukov’s plan did perform efficiently. Such a result would have been expected, given the thorough planning process that the Soviet General ensued. Although clearly not lacking in originality, this type of strategy must be prepared in advance, and it must not be relied upon too heavily given that it was only a supplementary approach, designed to guide and motivate the Soviet troops; the projectors were only able to assist in the defeat of the Nazi forces when combined with existent training, endurance and morale of the Soviet men as well as the leadership skills, experience and established tactical preferences of the Army Commanders.